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BETWEEN UNFITNESS AND COMMITMENT:
DIFFICULTIES IN THE DISPOSITION OF
UNFIT DEFENDANTS IN ILLINOIS
INTRODUCTION

In Illinois, there is currently a difference between the
substantive standards for unfitness to stand trial and those necessary for civil commitment to a mental hospital. Due to a procedural change in the disposition of an unfit defendant, both
standards must now be utilized. Prior to 1972, the Illinois statutory procedure prescribed that an accused felon found unfit
for trial be automatically committed to a mental institution.1
Shortly after this procedure was abolished by the legislature, a
similar scheme was held to be unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court. 2 However, constitutional violations still
exist under the present Illinois statute whereby an unfit defendant is remanded to the Department of Mental Health for a civil
commitment hearing.3 The procedural change in the disposition
1. Law of August 22, 1967, ch. 38, § 104-3, [1967] Ill. Laws 2829
(repealed 1972):
(a) A person who is found to be incompetent because of a mental condition shall be committed to the Department of Mental Health
during the continuance of that condition.
(b) When reasonable grounds exist to believe that an incompetent is now competent the court in the county wherein the incompetent is confined or the court in which incompetency was found shall
conduct a hearing in accordance with this Article to determine the
person's present mental condition. Reasonable notice of such hearing shall be given to the State, the incompetent and to his attorney
of record, if any. If the court, following such hearing, finds the person to be competent the proceedings pending against him shall be
resumed.
(c) A person committed to the Department of Mental Health
under the provisions of this Article who is thereafter sentenced for
the offense charged at the time of his commitment shall be credited
with the time during which he was committed and confined in a public or private institution and that portion of his sentence shall be considered served.
2. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), discussed at notes 47-62
infra.
3. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2 (1973):
(a) If the defendant is found unfit to stand trial or be sentenced,
the court shall remand the defendant to a hospital, as defined by the
Mental Health Code of 1967, and shall order that a hearing be conducted in accordance with the procedures, and within the time periods, specified in such Act. The disposition of defendant pursuant to
such hearing, and the admission, detention, care, treatment and discharge of any such defendant found to be in need of mental treatment, shall be determined in accordance with such Act. If the defendant is not ordered hospitalized in such hearing, the Department
of Mental Health shall petition the trial court to release the defendant on bail or recognizance, under such conditions as the court finds
appropriate, which may include, but need not be limited to requiring
the defendant to submit to or to secure treatment for his mental condition.
(b) A defendant hospitalized under this Section shall be re-
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of unfit defendants now juxtaposes the differences between the
substantive standards for unfitness to stand trial 4 and those
turned to the court not more than 90 days after the court's original
finding of unfitness, and each 12 months thereafter. At such re-examination the court may proceed, find, and order as in the first instance under paragraph (a) of this Section. If the court finds that
defendant continues to be unfit to stand trial or be sentenced but
that he no longer requires hospitalization, the defendant shall be released under paragraph (a) of this Section on bail or recognizance.
Either the State or the defendant may at any time petition the court
for review of the defendant's fitness.
(c) A person found unfit under the provisions of this Article
who is thereafter sentenced for the offense charged at the time of
such finding, shall be credited with time during which he was confined in a public or private hospital after such a finding of unfitness.
If a defendant has been confined in a public or private hospital after
a finding of unfitness under Section 5-2-6 for a period equal to the
maximum sentence of imprisonment that could be imposed under
Article 8 for the offense or offenses charged, the court shall order the
charge or charges dismissed or motion of the defendant, his guardian, or the Director of the Department of Mental Health.
(d) An order finding the defendant unfit is a final order for
purposes of appeal by the State or by the defendant.
4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1 (1973):
(a) For the purposes of this Section a defendant is unfit to stand
trial or be sentenced if, because of a mental or physical condition,
he is unable:
(1) to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him; or
(2) to assist in his defense.
(b) The question of the defendant's fitness may be raised before trial or during trial. The question of the defendant's fitness to
be sentenced may be raised after judgment but before sentence. In
either case the question of fitness may be raised by the State, the defendant or the court.
(c) When a bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness to stand
trial or be sentenced is raised, the court shall order that a determination of that question be made before further proceedings.
(d) When the question of the defendant's fitness to stand trial
is raised prior to the commencement of trial, the question shall be
determined by the court, or by a jury. The defendant or the State
may request a jury or the judge may on his own motion order a jury.
When the question is raised after commencement of the trial, the
question shall be determined by the court.
(e) Subject to the rules of evidence, matters admissible on the
question of the defendant's fitness to stand trial or be sentenced may
include, but shall not be limited to, the following items:
(1) the defendant's social behavior or abilities; orientation
as to time and place; recognition and correlation of persons,
places and things; performance of motor processes; and behavioral functions, habits, and practices;
(2) the defendant's knowledge and understanding of the nature of the charge; of the nature of the proceedings; of the consequences of a finding, judgment or sentence; of the courtroom
facilities and personnel; and of the functions of the participants
in the trial process;
(3) the defendant's abilities before and during-trial to observe, recollect, consider, correlate and narrate occurrences, especially those concerning his own past and those concerning the
incidents alleged; to communicate with counsel: and to reason
and make judgments concerning questions and suggestions of
counsel before trial and in the trial process.
(f) Any party may introduce evidence as to the defendant's fitness.
(g) If requested by the State or defendant, the court shall appoint a qualified expert or experts to examine the defendant and
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necessary for civil commitment. 5 The result of this dichotomy
is that a person charged with a felony may be found unfit to
stand trial, but not sufficiently in need of mental treatment
under current standards to be committed.
When a defendant is found unfit to stand trial, but not sufficiently in need of mental treatment to be civilly committed, the
accused is returned to jail and the Department of Mental Health
is instructed to petition the trial court to release the accused
on bail or recognizance. 6 If bail is denied or set at an amount
which the defendant is unable to pay,7 the accused may remain
testify regarding his fitness. The court shall enter an order on the
county board to pay the expert or experts.
(h) No statement by the defendant in any examination regarding his fitness, shall be admissible on the question of guilt.
(i) The burden of proving the defendant is not fit is on the defendant if he raises the question and on the State if the State or the
court raises the question.
(j) The party raising the question has the burden of going forward with the evidence. If the court raises the question, the State
shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence. At a fitness hearing held at the instance of the court, the court may call and
examine witnesses on the question of fitness.
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-11 (1973):
'Person in Need of Mental Treatment', when used in this Act, means
any person affected with a mental disorder, not including a person
who is mentally retarded, as defined in this Act, if that person, as a
result of such mental disorder, is reasonably expected at the time the
determination is being made or within a reasonable time thereafter
to intentionally or unintentionally physically injure himself or other
persons, or is unable to care for himself so as to guard himself from
physical injury or to provide for his own physical needs. This term
does not include a person whose mental processes have merely been
weakened or impaired by reason of advanced years.
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2(a) (1973).
7. It has not been determined whether release by bail or recognizance is mandatory under § 1005-2-2(a). The issue has been presented
to the Illinois Supreme Court, but the Court did not resolve the problem.
People ex rel. Martin v. Strayhorn, Illinois Supreme Court Docket No.
47777 (Jan. 26, 1976). In light of the wording of § 1005-2-2(b) it seems
that release on bail or recognizance is mandatory, i.e., "the defendant
shall be released under paragraph (a) of this Section, on bail or recognizance." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2(b) (1973) (emphasis added).
If an unfit defendant, who has been hospitalized but no longer requires
hospitalization, must be released under § 1005-2-2(b), an unfit defendant
who needs no hospitalization seemingly must be released under § 10052-2(a). If release is mandatory, it may be on financially securable bail,
recognizance or treatment as a condition of bail. As a medical proposition, out-patient treatment is desirable. See Engleberg, Pretrial Crimiinal Commitment to Mental Institutions: The Procedurein Massachusetts
and Suggested Reforms, 17 CATH. L. REV. 163, 182 (1968).
Some situations may make bail inappropriate. "All persons shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses where the proof
is evident or the presumption great." ILL. CONST. Art. I, § 9 (1970).
[T] he constitutional right to bail must be qualified by the authority of the courts, as an incident of their power to manage the
conduct of proceedings before them, to deny or revoke bail when
such action is appropriate to preserve the orderly process of criminal
procedure.
People ex rel. Hemingway v. Elrod, 60 Ill. 2d 74, 79, 322 N.E.2d 837, 840
(1975). The right to bail must be balanced against the general public's
right to receive reasonable, protective consideration by the courts. Id.
The right to bail is not absolute. Id. If it appears that the defendant
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in jail for an indeterminate period without proceeding to trial
or receiving treatment. Thus, the accused is denied his right to
a speedy trial, due process, and equal protection.
The result under the present statutory procedures is that an
accused may not be committable for treatment, not triable on the
criminal charge, and not releasable on bail. The ultimate issue
thus is whether such an accused felon should be tried although
unfit or whether he should be released. This comment will
examine several cases wherein this situation was presented to
the courts, and the compliance of the current Illinois procedures
with the constitutional guidelines established by the United
States Supreme Court.8 The problems inherent in the trial of
the unfit defendant will be noted, with possible solutions proposed that may help to alleviate these difficulties.
THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS
Unfitness to Stand Trial
In all state and federal courts, it is the general rule that
no person can stand trial in a criminal proceeding if he is
adjudged unfit.9 The rationale of this rule is that it would be
will not appear for trial, bail may be denied. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S.
1 (1951).
Thus it seems that bail may be denied in some instances. It follows
then that bail might be set at an amount which is insecurable by the
defendant. If bail can be denied, release on recognizance cannot be mandatory. Therefore it will be assumed that bail can be denied or set at
an amount which is insecurable by an unfit defendant not in need of
mental treatment.
8. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383
U.S. 107 (1966).
9. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§" 424-26 (1959); ALAS. STAT. ANN. §§
12.45.100 et seq. (1972); Am. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1621.01 (Supp. 1973),
§ 13-1622 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1301 et seq. (Supp. 1975), §
59-411 (1971); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1368-1374 (West Supp. 1975);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-6 (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-40 (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. RULE CRIM. PROC. §
1.210 (1968); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1502 to 1504 (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT
ANN. §§ 711-91 to 92 (1968); IDAHO PENAL AND CORRECTION CODE §§ 18404 et seq. (Session Laws 1971, ch. 143); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 10052-1 to 2 (Smith-Hurd 1973); IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1708 (Burns Supp.
1974); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 783.1 et seq. (1950), §§ 783.3 to .4 (Supp.
1975); KAN. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 22-3301 et seq. (1974); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. RULE CmIM. PROC. § 8.06 (1972); LA. STAT. ANN. CRaM. PROC. §§
641 et seq. (1967); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101 (Supp. 1975); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 59, § 23 et seq. (1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123,
§§ 15-16 (Supp. 1974); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.800(1020) (Supp. 1975);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.18 (Supp. 1975); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-13-03
et seq. (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020 (Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 95-504 (Supp. 1965); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-1823 (Cum.
Supp. 1974); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 178.400 et seq. (1973); N.H. REV. STAT.
(Ann. § 135:17) (Supp. 1972), § 135:18 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 16362 (1971), 30:4-82 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-13-2.1 to 3.2
(1953); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 658 et seq. (McKinney 1958), 730.10.40 (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 122-83 et seq.
(1974); N.D. R. ClaM. P., Rule 12.2 (1974); OHo REV. CODE ANN. §§
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fundamentally unfair to try the unfit defendant because he is
unable to assert matters known only to him on behalf of his
own defense.1
In Illinois when a doubt is raised as to the
defendant's fitness by the defendant himself, the state, or the
court, the court must suspend all proceedings and determine the
defendant's ability to stand trial."
The Illinois standard states that a "...
defendant is unfit
to stand trial or be sentenced if, because of a mental or physical
condition, he is unable: (1) to understand the nature and purposes of the proceedings against him; or (2) assist in his
defense."'1 2 This statutory criterion conforms essentially with
the constitutional standard delineated by the United States
Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States.'"
Although the substantive standards for unfitness have remained essentially unchanged in Illinois,' 4 the procedural dis2945.37-.38 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1161 et seq. (Supp.
1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 503.1 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. ch. 19, §§
1351-52 (1964), ch. 50, §§ 4408-09 (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 264-1 et seq. (Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-969 to 970 (1964); S.D.
COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 23-38-1 to 9 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-708
(1974); TEX. CODE ANN. art. 46.02 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7748-2 et seq. (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 4821-2 (1974); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 19.2-167 to 178 (1975); REV. CODE WASH. ANN. § 117.1-30 (Supp.
1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 827-6A-1 to 8 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
974.03 (Supp. 1975); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-242.1 (Supp. 1975). See also
D.C. CODE ENcYc. ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. 1975). Delaware apparently has
no statutory provision, but does follow the common law rule. Mills v.
State, 256 A.2d 752 (Del. 1969).
The words "unfit" and "incompetent" are basically interchangeable
under these statutes. In Illinois there was a change in the terminology
of the unfitness statute in 1973. "Unfit" replaced the word "incompetent." The Council Commentary explains.
Fitness speaks only to a person's ability to function within the context of a trial, whereas the term competence is a mental health term
dealing with whether an individual should be committed to an institution or not, and excludes consideration of physical fitness.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1, Commentary at 220 (Smith-Hurd
1973).

10. 4 W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *

395-96 (9th ed. 1783).

See

United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284 (S.D. Ala. 1906); Youtsey v. United
States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1(b) (c) (1973). People v. Barkan,
45 Ill. 2d 261, 259 N.E.2d 1 (1970); McDowell v. People, 33 Ill. 2d 121,
210 N.E.2d 533 (1965); People v. Davis, 25 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 324 N.E.2d
58 (5th Dist. 1975).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1 (a) (1973) (emphasis added).
13. 362 U.S. 402 (1960). The test is "whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him." Id.
14. "Physical defects" were added to the statutory standard for de-

termining unfitness in 1973. See text accompanying note 12 supra. The
prior statute was only concerned with mental disorders. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 104-1 (1971):
For the purpose of this Article, 'incompetent' means a person
charged with an offense who is unable because of a mental condition: (a) To understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings
against him; or (b) To assist in his defense; or (c) After a death sentence has been imposed, to understand the nature and purpose of
such sentence.
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position of one deemed unfit to stand trial was changed with
the passage of the Unified Code of Corrections of 1973.15 Prior
to this enactment, an accused defendant found unfit to stand trial
was automatically committed to the Department of Mental
Health for as long as that condition continued. 16 The Unified
Code changed this procedure by transferring an unfit defendant
to the Mental Health Department for a civil commitment hearing
in order to determine whether he is a person in need of mental
treatment.
In Need of Mental Treatment

Upon statutory remand to the Department of Mental Health,
the unfit defendant receives a hearing according to the procedures and time limits specified in the Mental Health Code. 17
This hearing-is a civil proceeding which is not limited to criminal
defendants, but is applicable to all persons subject to involuntary
commitment. The criterion used in determining whether the
person is in need of mental treatment is as follows:
[A]ny person afflicted with a mental disorder ...
if that
person, as a result of such mental disorder, is reasonably
expected ...
to intentionally or unintentionally physically

injure himself or other persons, or is unable to care for himself so as to guard himself from physical injury or to provide

for his own physical needs.' 8
If a criminal defendant is found to be so afflicted, he may then
be civilly committed.19
The criterion for unfitness includes both physical and mental
defects causing an inability to understand or aid in the proceedings. The standard for commitment relates only to mental disorders and potential danger to oneself or others. Thus, a defendant
could be unfit to stand trial, yet not be sufficiently in need of
mental treatment to warrant civil commitment. An accused is
then caught between these divergent standards and may languish
in a statutorily-created limbo, neither receiving treatment nor
proceeding with trial. This effect can be seen in the case of
Tommy Hall.
15. Id. ch. 38, § 1001 et seq. (1973).
16. Id., § 104-3 (1971).
17. Id. ch. 91 , § 1-1 et seq. (1973). For a discussion on the civil
commitment procedures of the Mental Health Code of 1967, see Beis,
Civil Commitment: Rights of the Mentally Disabled, Recent Developments and Trends, 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 42 (1973).
18. ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-11 (1973). This standard was sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
19. ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 91%, § 9-6 (1973). This section instructs the
court to consider alternate forms of treatment or care including but not
limited to hospitalization.
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THE EFFECT OF THE DISCREPANT STANDARDS:
AN EXAMPLE

Tommy Hall was arrested and jailed for armed robbery in
October of 1972.20 Over a year later, in January of 1974, he
was found unfit to stand trial, and his case was thereafter
remanded to the Department of Mental Health pursuant to the
unfitness statute. 21 One month later it was determined that
defendant was not in need of mental treatment, and he was discharged from the custody of the Department and returned to
jail. 22

In accordance with the statutory mandate, 23 the De-

partment of Mental Health filed a petition with the trial court
for the release of the defendant on bail or recognizance. A hearing was set for March, 1974, but was continued until the middle
of April, 1974, at which time the trial court did not rule on the
petition, but once again found the defendant unfit for trial. The
accused was remanded to the Department of Mental Health,
where he was once again found not to be in need of mental treatment. He was again discharged from the custody of the Depart24
ment and returned to jail.

In June of 1974, upon a renewed petition for bail or recognizance, the trial judge denied the petition and once again
ordered the defendant into the custody of the Department of
Mental Health despite the earlier discharge order of that office. 25 The accused was next examined in March of 1975, and
found to be unfit for trial. In May of the same year he was
found not to be in need of mental treatment at a civil commitment hearing. The judge at that hearing again ordered the
defendant to be discharged from the Department's custody, but
Hall was not released. 26 Thus, defendant had been found unfit
to stand trial on three separate occasions, yet upon each mandatory remand to the Department of Mental Health, he was found
not sufficiently in need of mental treatment to be civilly committed and confined. Nonetheless, his confinement continued.
As a result of the trial judge's failure to rule on the previous petitions for bail or recognizance, a petition for an original
20. People v. Hall, Indictment No. 72-3219 (Cook County, Ill. 1972).
21. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 38, § 1005-2-2(a) (1973).

See note 3 supra.

22. In the Matter of Tommy Hall, File No. 74 CrNMT 013 (Cir. Ct.
Cook County, Ill. 1974).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2(a) (1973).
24. In the Matter of Tommy Hall, File No. 74 CrNMT 070 (Cir. Ct.
Cook County, Ill. 1974).
25. This had the effect of an automatic commitment without due
process as was the case under the prior statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 104-3 (1971). See People ex rel. Martin v. Strayhorn, Ill. Supreme

Court Docket No. 47777 (Jan. 26, 1976).

26. In the Matter of Tommy Hall, File No. 75 CrNMT 080 (Cir. Ct.
Cook County, Ill. 1975).

912

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 9:905

writ of mandamus was filed with the Illinois Supreme Court.
The petition was denied, as was the motion by the petitioner for
release on his own recognizance.2 7 The case was remanded to
the trial court with instructions to conduct a bail hearing and
enter an appropriate order if it was determined that defendant
remained unfit to stand trial but not in need of mental treatment.

28

The supreme court did not determine whether release on bail
or recognizance is mandatory. 29 Situations will arise when bail
can either be denied or set at an amount which the accused
cannot secure. 80 In such a situation the accused cannot stand
trial due to his unfitness, cannot be civilly committed as he is
not in need of mental treatment, and cannot be released from
jail for lack of bail. Although Tommy Hall never received a

bail hearing, his release was eventually obtained. The parties
stipulated that he was fit for trial, and he pleaded guilty to a
lesser charge

and

was released

for time

already

served. 81

Tommy Hall spent approximately fifteen months in jail without
going to trial or receiving treatment to become fit for trial.
Because of the divergent substantive standards and the procedural difficulties in their implementation, Hall was denied due

process, equal protection,8 2 and his right to a speedy trial.88
27. People ex rel. Hall v. Massey, Ill. Supreme Court Docket No.
46979 (Jan. 29, 1975).
28. In the Department of Mental Health's renewed petition for Hall's
release on bail or recognizance, it states that:
[D]efendant has now been confined to a facility of the Department for well over one year from the date of the first order of discharge, and that there have been two subsequent orders of discharge;
that such confinement violates the civil rights of defendant and exposes the Department to liability therefore; that the continued confinement of defendant in a Department facility places the Department in the position of violating valid orders of the Circuit Court of
Cook County, thereby risking contempt thereof; that this situation
places the Department in an untenable position not envisioned by the
Legislature and caused solely by the failure of the trial court to entertain the Petition for Release on Bail or Recognizance and rule
thereon.
People v. Hall, Indictment No. 72-3219 (Cook County, Ill. 1972).
29. In a case with a similar factual situation, the issue was presented
to the Illinois Supreme Court. The Court stated "the posture of this action is not in the proper framework for resolving this question." People
ex rel. Martin v. Strayhorn, Ill. Supreme Court Docket No. 47777 (Jan.
26, 1976).
30. See note 7 supra.
31. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2(c) (1973).
32. In People v. Byrnes, 7 Ill. App. 3d 735, 288 N.E.2d 690 (1972),
a writ of habeas corpus was granted to a defendant who was held in
a mental hospital for over 17 months. He was automatically committed
upon a finding of unfitness. In holding that Byrnes was denied due
process and equal protection, the court relied heavily on Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). Byrnes also claimed that he had been denied
his right to a speedy trial.
33. See generally Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973);
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967).
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IMPETUS FOR CHANGE:

THE CASE OF DONALD LANG

Rumblings of discontent concerning the automatic and
indefinite commitment of an unfit defendant 3 4 surfaced in
Illinois with the case of Donald Lang, People ex rel. Myers v.
Briggs.35 The case posed special problems for the Illinois courts
in that Donald Lang was an illiterate deaf-mute who knew no
recognizable sign language and could communicate only minimally. 6

Initially indicted for murder in 1965, Lang was found

physicially unfit to stand trial because his mutism severely
limited his ability to communicate. He was then determined to
be mentally unfit to stand trial3 7 and was committed to a mental
hospital "until he shall have fully and permanently recovered
from his mental incompetence.

'3

Two years after his commitment, the superintendent of the
institution in which the accused was confined wrote a letter to
the Special Counsel of the Department of Mental Health reporting on Donald Lang's status. The superintendent stated that the
defendant would probably never acquire the communicative
skills necessary to comply with the required standards of fitness.
As there was little possibility that Lang would become fit in the
future, the superintendent suggested that a court of law determine the disposition of the accused.3 9 The letter was used as
the basis for obtaining a writ of habeas corpus 40 which ordered
the defendant's release from the institution and signalled the
beginning of his trial.
Because the facts of the case were unique in American jurisprudence, the court, in deciding to proceed with the trial, relied
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 104-3 (1971).

35. 46 Ill. 2d 281, 263 N.E.2d 109 (1970)

[hereinafter cited as Myers].

The full name of the case is The People ex rel. Lowell J. Myers, on be-

half of Donald Lang v. John F. Briggs, Director of the Department of
Mental Health. Attorney Myers was appointed by the court to represent
Lang. Myers had many years of experience representing deaf-mutes and

was deaf himself.

36. Lang was indicted for two murders, years apart, which occurred

under similar circumstances.

See text accompanying notes 69-72 infra.

Donald Lang's plight in the criminal and mental health systems of Illi-

nois is documented in a book entitled for Lang's nickname.

DUMMY,

TmYmAx (1974).

37. ILL. REV. STAT. ci. 38, § 104-1 (1971).

See note 14 supra.

38. People v. Lang, 37 Ill. 2d 75, 79, 224 N.E.2d 838, 840 (1967).
39. Based on our experience with Donald Lang, it now appears that
he will never acquire the necessary communication skills needed to
participate and cooperate in his trial ....
The probability for his
acquiring the necessary communication skills at any future date is
unlikely.... It is apparent ... that Donald's future must be decided in a court of law. He will not be able to communicate even in
the limited sense as we had first anticipated.
46 Ill. 2d at 284-85, 263 N.E.2d at 111-12.
40. See

ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 65, § 22 (1973).

The letter constituted an

act which had taken place after confinement whereby the defendant became entitled to his discharge. 46 Ill. 2d at 285, 263 N.E.2d at 112.
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on the English case of Regina v. Roberts. 4 1 In dealing with
a similar situation, the English court opined that a handicapped
defendant could not be kept indefinitely in an institution without
trial on the criminal charge because it ". . might result in the
grave injustice of detaining as a criminal lunatic a man who was
'42
innocent.
Following the English reasoning, the Illinois Supreme Court
ordered the trial to proceed with the trial judge "afford[ing]
such a defendant reasonable facilities for confronting and crossexamining witnesses as the circumstances will permit. '43 The
court did not state what specific procedures might be used to
safeguard the disabled defendant. The court left it to the discretion of the presiding judge to prescribe protective standards
according to the circumstances of each case. The case of Donald
Lang never went to trial due to the death of the state's principal
witness. After more than five years, the defendant was released.
The case of Donald Lang is significant in several respects.
The Illinois Supreme Court indicated that certain unfit defendants might stand trial under certain circumstances and with adequate protective measures. 44 Myers also prompted reform in
the disposition of an unfit defendant. In July of 1972, new legislation was passed abolishing automatic commitment upon a finding of unfitness.4 51 Later that same year, the United States
Supreme Court decided Jackson v. Indiana,46 and held that an
Indiana statute similar to that recently abolished in Illinois was
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court Standards: Jackson v. Indiana
Although the present Illinois statute47 complies with the
current Supreme Court guidelines, the standard for commitment
of unfit defendants in Illinois is more stringent than the due
process standards imposed by the Supreme Court. Illinois
permits an indefinite commitment when an unfit defendant is
also found to be in need of mental treatment at a civil commitment hearing. This procedure is in accord with equal protection
standards set out by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana.48
41. 2 All England Reports 340 (1953).
42. Id.
43. 46 Ill. 2d at 287, 263 N.E.2d at 113.
44. This court is of the opinion that this defendant, handicapped as
he is and facing an indefinite commitment because of the pending
indictment against him, should be given an opportunity to obtain a
trial to determine whether or not he is guilty as charged or should be
released.
46 Ill. 2d at 288, 263 N.E.2d at 113.
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2 (1973). See note 3 supra.
46. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2 (1973).
48. 406 U.S. 715 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Jackson].
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However, the due process holding in Jackson allows for a limited
commitment without a civil hearing for a reasonable period in
order to determine whether there is a substantial probability that
the accused will become fit in the near future. Illinois does not
sanction this type of disposition of an unfit defendant.
Before examining the Jackson decision, it is helpful to look
at its predecessor, Baxstrom v. Herold,49 upon which the Jackson Court based its equal protection holding. Baxstrom was
convicted of assault and sentenced to two and one-half to three
years imprisonment. During his confinement, he was determined
to be mentally ill and transferred to a security hospital under
the control of the Department of Corrections. When Baxstrom's
penal sentence was about to terminate, the director of the hospital filed a petition seeking that Baxstrom be civilly committed
upon the termination of his sentence. 50 At a hearing without
a jury, as was required for civil commitments of non-criminals,
Baxstrom was found to be committable. He was returned to the
same security hospital, after the Department of Mental Health
determined at an ex parte hearing that Baxstrom was unfit for
confinement within a civil hospital. In holding that the petitioner was denied equal protection of the laws, the Court stated
that the civil commitment standards for non-criminals and convicted criminals upon expiration of their sentence should be the
same, with each requiring a jury review.
In Jackson, the accused was a 27 year old, mentally defective deaf mute. He could not read, write, or otherwise communicate except through a primitive sign language. He was charged
with two separate robberies, one for four dollars and the other
for five dollars. Upon a plea of not guilty, a hearing was held
and Jackson was found unfit to stand trial.5 1 He was then auto52
matically committed until such time as he was found to be fit.
The Jackson Court relied heavily on Baxstrom in determining that Jackson was denied equal protection by being automatically committed for an indefinite period under a more
lenient standard than those not charged with a crime merely
because he was found unfit to stand trial. Utilizing Baxstrom
and borrowing from Commonwealth v. Drucken,53 the Court
reasoned that if one convicted of a crime can be committed for
an indefinite period only by using the same substantive and pro49. 383 U.S. 107 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Baxstrom].
50. N.Y. CoRREcTioN LAW § 384 (McKinney 1966).
IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1972).
52. Id. §§ 22-1201 to 1256 (1972).
53. 356 Mass. 503, 254 N.E.2d 779 (1969).
51.

The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that an accused criminal could only be committed under the same procedures used for civil commitment.
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cedural standards that are used in a civil proceeding, then one
who is merely charged with a crime must be afforded the same
54
protection.
As the record indicated that the defendant probably would
not become fit to stand trial, the Court additionally found that
the defendant was being denied due process in that his indefinite
,commitment amounted to a life sentence. 55 "At the least, due
process requires that the nature and duration of commitment
bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
individual is committed."' 6 Due process requires that any
commitment due to one's unfitness to stand trial be for the purpose of treating the accused so that he may eventually stand
trial. The possibility of a life commitment not based on civil
commitment standards did not meet this requirement. Since the
defendant's indefinite commitment bore no reasonable relation
to the purpose for which he had been committed, and because
he was committed under a more lenient standard due to his unfitness to stand trial, Jackson was denied his right to due process
and equal protection.
The Court related the standard for the time one may be
committed due to unfitness to stand trial:
[A] person charged . . .with a criminal offense who
is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to
trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.
If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must
either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that
would be required to 5commit
indefinitely any other citizen, or
7
release the defendant.
Although the Court further stated that any continued commitment for unfitness must be justified by progress towards the
defendant's ability to stand trial, it did not relate the disposition
of the unfit defendant found not to be civilly committable.
Thus, Jackson and Baxstrom hold that equal protection
demands that any commitment for an indefinite term of a
criminal defendant must apply the same procedures and substantive standards that apply to all persons civilly committed for an
indefinite time. The present Illinois law complies with this constitutional mandate. 8s However, the Jackson Court also sanc54. If criminal conviction and imposition of sentence are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all others, the
mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice.
406 U.S. at 724.
55. Id. at 725.
56. Id. at 738.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2 (1973).
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tioned the commitment of an unfit defendant without using civil
standards if such commitment is only for a reasonable time in
order to determine whether there is a substantial probability that
the defendant will become fit in the foreseeable future. Illinois,
rather than allowing for such a limited commitment without a
civil hearing, restricts the commitment of an unfit defendant to
a single civil commitment standard-a mental disorder and
dangerousness to oneself or others 59 -determined at a civil hearing. Although the Illinois statutory procedures minimally satisfy the requirements of Jackson,6" these statutes have created
a different, yet analogous problem which remains unresolved.
A defendant charged with a felony may be found unfit to
stand trial yet not sufficiently in need of mental treatment to
be civilly committed. The accused is then returned to jail."'
Upon the judge's refusal to set bond, or upon the defendant's
inability to pay bond, 62 he remains incarcerated without treatment and without proceeding to trial. Thus, although having
the foresight to evade the constitutional violations denounced in
Jackson, the Illinois legislature has unwittingly created a statutory void depriving a number of unfit, uncommittable felons
their right to due process, equal protection, and a speedy trial.
THE TRIAL OF AN UNFIT DEFENDANT

Rather than continue to attempt the implementation of the
present statute, it is essential that additional procedures be
enacted by the legislature. Difficulties arise when the defendant
is unfit to stand trial, is not in need of mental treatment, and
is denied or cannot afford bail. Since the defendant is not
committable to a hospital for treatment, not releasable from jail,
and not triable, the legislature must determine whether the
accused should be tried although unfit or be released.
Despite the long-standing rule that an unfit defendant
cannot be tried on a criminal charge, 6' there have been indications that the trial and conviction of an unfit defendant may
be upheld. In Jackson, the Supreme Court intimated that the
trial of an unfit defendant may be permitted.
We do not read this Court's previous decisions . . . to preclude
the States from allowing, at a minimum, an incompetent defendant to raise certain defenses such as insufficiency of the
indictment, or make certain pretrial motions through counsel.6 4
59. Id. ch. 91

, § 1-11 (1973).

60. People v. Lang, 26 Ill. App. 3d 648, 325 N.E.2d 305 (1975), cert.

denied 44 U.S.L.W. 3412 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1976).

61. See text accompanying note 22 supra.

62. See note 7 supra.
63. See notes 9 and 10 supra,
64. 406 U.S. at 741 (emphasis added).

The court cited the previous
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In Myers, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed for trial of an
unfit defendant in the first murder case of Donald Lang only
if reasonable procedures were afforded the defendant to compensate for his disabilities.6 5 Although the court did not specify
any procedures, they may include complete pretrial discovery
including depositions, special jury instructions, corroborating
eye-witnesses, and a heavier burden of proof.6 6 Other jurisdictions have upheld the trial and conviction of deaf and blind defendants 67 while some states sanction the trial, but not the conviction, of an unfit defendant.6 8
After Donald Lang's release in Myers, he was indicted for
another murder in 1971.69 No fitness hearing was held and it
70
was presumed that Lang continued to be unfit to stand trial.
Rather than subject his client to the possibility of an automatic
life commitment, Lang's attorney chose to proceed with trial as
allowed in Myers. Lang was tried, convicted, and sentenced to
a term of 14 to 25 years. Due to defendant's total lack of ability
to communicate, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the conviction, stating that there were "no trial procedures which could
effectively compensate for the handicaps of a deaf mute with
whom there could be no communication."'"
The case was
remanded to the trial court with directions to proceed under the
present fitness statute. The United States Supreme Court denied
72
certiorari.
Even if the Illinois legislature were to enact a statute calling
for the trial of an unfit defendant not in need of mental treatment, certain procedures must be implemented in each case to
compensate for the accused's handicap. However, as Lang indicates, there may be no adequate procedures available to protect
a particular unfit defendant's constitutional rights. If such compensating procedures are not devised, defendants cannot be condecisions of Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) and Bishop v. United
States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956). In Pate, the Court held that defendant's
right of due process had been violated because he was convicted even
though the question of his fitness was raised but never formally determined at trial. In Bishop, the Court overturned defendant's conviction
and remanded the case in order to determine defendant's fitness to stand
trial.
65. See text accompanying notes 34-44 supra.
66. Burt and Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea,40 U. Cm. L. REv. 66 (1972).
67. See Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 1084; 21 AM. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 338
(Supp. 1975).
68. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 17 (1972).
69. People v. Lang, 26 Ill. App. 3d 648, 325 N.E.2d 305 (1975), cert.
denied 44 U.S.L.W. 3412 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Lang].
70. Upon an initial finding of unfitness, a defendant is presumed to
remain unfit until it is adjudicated otherwise. People v. Santoro, 13
Ill. App. 3d 426, 301 N.E.2d 175 (1973).
71. 26 Ill. App. 3d at 653, 325 N.E.2d at 308.
72. 44 U.S.L.W. 3412 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1976).
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victed. Conversely, if by statutory mandate the unfit defendant
not in need of mental treatment is released and the charges are
dropped, further difficulties are encountered. An unfit defendant who has a mental defect but is not dangerous to himself
or others, and therefore not committable under the present
standard, 73 may be released without undue public concern
because of the fact that he is not dangerous. However, it is
apparent that crimes are likely to be repeated by an unfit defendant who cannot be committed because he has no apparent mental
74
disorder but is still dangerous.
Although neither a trial with procedures to compensate for
physical unfitness, nor the release of an unfit defendant not in
need of mental treatment, may provide the ultimate solution in
the narrowest circumstances, both should be considered by the
legislature in conjunction with other proposals which may
restrict the possible use of either procedure.
A

PROPosAL

In view of the inherent difficulties involved in the present
statutory scheme, two new procedures should be enacted by the
Illinois legislature. First, a commitment for a limited time upon
a finding of unfitness should be implemented within the sanctions espoused in Jackson. Second, the defendant should be afforded the option of having an evidentiary hearing prior to any
civil commitment to determine if the state has sufficient evidence
to convict.
Limited Commitment
Upon a finding of unfitness under the present statute,7 5 the
court or jury will review testimony and other such relevant evidence that will aid in determining whether or not there is a "substantial probability" that the defendant, with treatment, will
become fit in the "foreseeable future. '76 If it is found that the
accused is "temporarily unfit," he may be committed. Since the
Jackson opinion suggests that such an unfit defendant may be
held only for a "reasonable period of time," it is necessary to
establish a maximum limit for such commitment to insure that
discretion does not lead to abuse. Other jurisdictions allow lim73. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91, § 1-11 (1973).
74. As an example, Donald Lang was indicted for two murders, years

apart, which happened under similar circumstances. See note 36 supra.
Tommy Hall was also recently indicted again for armed robbery. Indictment No. 75-5893 (Cook County, Ill., 1975).
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1 (1973).
76. This is the due process standard sanctioned in Jackson. See text
accompanying note 57 supra.
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ited commitment anywhere from six months to a period equivalent to a maximum sentence for the crime of which the per-

son stands accused. 7 7 The Illinois legislature should consider
a commitment period of six to eighteen months while requiring
periodic reports informing the court of the defendant's progress.
If the court or jury finds that there is not a substantial probability that the defendant will become fit in the time allowed,
the accused would then be remanded to the Department of
Mental Health and receive a civil commitment hearing under the
present standards and procedures. 78 If the defendant is not in
need of mental treatment, he must then be either tried or
released.
Upon finding a substantial probability that the defendant
will become fit within a specified period of time, the accused will
be committed for that period. If it is determined that the
defendant is fit by the end of that period or at any time during
that period, he will be tried. A determination of continued unfitness will cause the court to remand the accused to the Department of Mental Health for a civil commitment hearing. If the
defendant is in need of mental treatment, he will be committed.
If the defendant is not in need of mental treatment, he will be
tried although unfit with compensating procedures taken by the
trial court, or released.
Evidentiary Hearing

In conjunction with the passage of a limited commitment
statute, it is also suggested that there be a provision allowing
for an evidentiary hearing. At any time after a finding of unfit77. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-40 (1975)
tence); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 17 (1974)

(maximum sen-

(six months with

a one year extension). See Drendel v. United States, 403 F.2d 55 (5th
Cir. 1968) (eighteen months).
78. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra. Upon civil commit-

ment all charges should be dropped. The Jackson Court did not decide
this question because it was not sufficiently "ripe." 406 U.S. at 739. An
accused who is civilly committed is not likely to become fit in the foreseeable future. Due to the indefinite length of civil commitment, trial
upon release from civil commitment may deny defendant's right to a
speedy trial. United States ex rel. von Wolfersdorf v. Johnston, 317 F.
Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Jackson, 306 F. Supp. 4 (N.D.
Cal. 1969). There is also the possibility that the threat of future prosecution might inhibit the patient's amenability to treatment.
Under the present unfitness statute, it seems inconsistent that one
who is found unfit due to physical defects only is remanded to the Department of Mental Health for a hearing concerning mental disorders.
Therefore a defendant who is found unfit due to physical defects only
should be remanded to an appropriate state facility instead of the Department of Mental Health. Some situations may arise where a severe
physical handicap may have a close connection to functional retardation.
Such an unfit defendant may be committed. See, e.g., In the Matter of
Johnny Lee Murphy, File No. 75 CrNMT 009 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill.

1975).
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ness, but before civil commitment,7 9 defense counsel may, by
motion, request a hearing before the court to determine if the
state has a sufficient case to support conviction.
This hearing would be similar to the pretrial motions allowed
in other states where such motion does not require the participation of the defendant.8 0 Examples of these motions include dismissal due to insufficiency of the indictment, dismissal because
the statute of limitations has run, suppression of illegally obtained evidence, and other affirmative defenses.81 In State v.
McCreedeen,8 2 the Wisconsin Supreme Court sanctioned a procedure to be used by the state's circuit courts when the question
of defendant's sanity arose. The procedure required that a hearing be held to determine probable guilt. If the state failed to
prove that probability, the defendant was discharged.
The benefits of such a procedure would not run solely to
the defendant, but to the court and the prosecution as well. By
enacting a similar procedure with provisions allowing for the
relaxation of the rules of evidence and discovery, the state is
able to preserve the testimony of witnesses for any subsequent
trial.8 3 The court may also be better able to determine the
mental state8 4 of the accused shortly after the commission of
the alleged crime as opposed to waiting until a later date.
The accused is afforded the opportunity of establishing his
innocence, or at least the improbability of his guilt. He will be
discharged before any civil commitment if the court's finding is
that of improbable guilt. If the decision indicates that there is
probable guilt, the determination of substantial probability of fitness in the foreseeable future or civil commitment must then
be made in accordance with the procedures previously outlined.
CONCLUSION

By allowing an evidentiary hearing and the possibility of a
limited commitment, the chances of an unfit defendant not in
need of mental treatment being tried or released are decreased.
In this way, the state will have a procedure, sanctioned by the
79. Upon civil commitment, charges would be dropped.

supra.

See note 78

80. See, e.g., MoNT. REV. CODE ANN. § 95-506 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CODE
PRO. § 730.60(5) (McKinney Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.14

CRIM.

(6) (1971).
81. See Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832 (1960).
82. 33 Wis. 2d 661, 148 N.W.2d 33 (1967).

83. In the first Lang murder case, Lang never went to trial because
the state's principal witness died in the five years between arrest and
the time set for trial. See text accompanying notes 34-44 supra.
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2 (1973), describes and defines the mental states as utilized in the application of the Illinois Criminal Code.
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United States Supreme Court in Jackson, that may be implemented before proceeding to more drastic measures. There
remains, however, the extreme situation in which these procedures will not dispose of the defendant's case. In this instance
the legislature should sanction the trial of an unfit defendant
not in need of mental treatment or allow for his release.
In the narrowest of circumstances there still remains the
possibility that the trial or release of an unfit defendant not in
need of mental treatment will not sufficiently dispose of the
accused. If there are no adequate procedures implemented at
trial to compensate for the defendant's particular handicap, he
cannot be convicted. If an unfit defendant is deemed dangerous
but not in need of mental treatment, it would be difficult to
rationalize his release in light of the necessity of public protection. The utmost care must be taken in the consideration of
each such case in order to determine whether there are any sufficient compensating procedures to enable the commencement of
trial. The potential danger of each accused must be weighed
heavily to determine if he can be released on bail or otherwise.
Each such case will be different and judicial discretion plays a
key role.
Admittedly there are few cases where a defendant is not bailable, not triable, and not committable. Nonetheless, the fact
remains that there have been such cases. The defendants in
those cases have been subjected to statutes that do not protect the rights of due process, equal protection, and a speedy trial.
Legislative change is urgently needed.
F. Kevin Murnighan

